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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
VITO TODARO and GUISEPPE 
FONTANA, Appellants, 
vs. Case No. 8239 
]. D. GARDNER, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 20, 1948, the Respondent filed his complaint 
in the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the 
County of Maricopa, (Exhibit P-14) wherein he alleges that 
on the 28th day of June 1947 he loaned to appellants the 
sum of $5,000.00, and in his second cause of action in said 
complaint contained he sets forth and alleges the particulars 
under which he allegedly loaned the Appellants said $5,000.00. 
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The appellants filed their answer and later an amended 
answer to said complaint, denying the loan, but alleging that 
the respondent entered into an agreement with the appellants 
to purchase a certain motel of the appellants located in Ari-
zona and attached to said (Exhibit P-14) is the agreement 
proposed but not signed by said parties. 
The matter went to trial in said Superior Court, and at 
the conclusion of evidence, judgment was entered in favor of 
respondent, J. D. Gardner, and against the appellants herein 
for said sum of $5,000.00. 
Appellants herein then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Arizona, and said judgment of the Superiod Court of Maricopa 
County was reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court 
with directions to enter judgment for the defendants, ( appel-
lants herein) (Exhibit P-18). 
Pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court of Arizona, 
the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, accordingly 
entered judgment in favor of the appallants herein and against 
the respondent herein for the sum of $5,000.00 with interest 
at 6% per annum from June 27, 1949 until paid together 
with accruing costs until paid, in the sum of $247.55 (Exhibit 
A). 
On January 18, 1952 the appellants herein filed an action 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, against the respondent herein 
upon the judgment of the Superior Court of Maripoca County, 
Arizona, and that the same had not been paid (R-1). 
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The responden, J. D. Gardner, filed his answer to said 
complaint, (R-4), admitting the allegations of paragraphs 
1 and 2 of said complaint and admitting that on the 5th day 
of July 1951, an action was pending in the court of said Mari-
copa County, Arizona between said parties and that said par-
ties had appeared in said action in person and by counsel 
and denies the other allegations of paragraph 3· of said com-
plaint, and further denying that the defendant therein, ( re-
spondent herein) is indebted to appellants, herein and admits 
that no sum has been paid to appellants. 
Respondent then interposes a "First affirmative defense" 
in which he alleges in substance that on the 28th day of June, 
1947 he advanced to appellants herein the sum of $5,000.00 
to be used as a down payment on the purchase price of a motel 
upon the express conditions precedent that said money was 
only to be retained by the appellants herein if after further 
investigation the defendant, (respondent herein) was reason-
ably convinced that there was no risk involved to the operation 
of the property because of certain reasons he sets forth in 
his affirmative defense and that after investigation the re-
spondent herein concluded that he would not go through with 
the agreement and that appellants were obligated to repay 
said $5,000.00 to respondent herein (Tr. 4). 
Pursuant thereto appellants herein filed a "Motion to 
Strike (Tr. 6), moving the court to strike from the answer of 
respondent herein said First Affirmative defense upon the 
grounds that said defense was not a pleadable defense to the 
complaint of the appellants herein, and that said affirmative 
defense does not state facts sufficient to entitle said respondent 
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herein to relief. Said motion was argued before the court 
and the appellants' herein motion to strike was denied (Tr. 8) 
and in due course the cause was set down for trial. 
At the trial of the cause and after the appellants rested 
their case the respondent herein proceeded to introduce evi-
dence in support of his affirmative defense, which evidence 
was timely objected to by appellants herein, upon the grounds 
that such evidence is not a pleadable defense to this action 
and that it does not state facts sufficient to entitle the defendant 
to any relief and that such matters are res adjudicata and same 
cannot be gone into as a set-off or counterclaim or otherwise, 
and that the court is not permitted to go into the merits of 
such a defense and that the court must give full faith and 
credit to the judgment of the State of Arizona. The court 
then overruled the objection and proceeded to trial (Tr. 16-
17-18). 
The court then took the matter under advisement and 
later rendered his decision in favor of the appellants herein for 
the sum of $5,000.00 together with interest and court costs 
and directed counsel for appellants to prepare and file findings 
of facts and conclusions of law and judgment in accordance 
therewith (Tr. 90-90-91)-
Respondent herein then files an objection to finding of 
fact and conclusion of law and judgment (Tr. 92). The matter 
was then argued and a brief of appellant was filed with the 
court on said matter which is contained in the exhibits but 
no mark of exhibit placed thereon. The court then took the 
matter under advisement and later reversed the court's decision 
and rendered judgment in favor of respondent for the sum 
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of $5,000.00 and interest at 6% per annum from the 5th day 
of September, 1947 to the 2nd day of November, 1949 in the 
sum of $647.50, and likewise rendered judgment in favor of 
the appellants herein for the sum of $5,000.00 plus court 
costs in the sum of $247.55, and concluded in the end that 
judgment for respondent should be in the net sum of $399.95. 
During the course of the trial and during the pre-trial 
it was agreed between counsel for the respective parties that 
pending the appeal of the cause of action in Arizona, the 
appellants herein had paid back to the respondent herein said 
sum of $5,000.00 as is disclosed by paragraph 5 of the pre-
trial order (Tr.lO). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION 
OF THE APPELLANT TO STRIKE FROM THE ANSWER 
OF THE RESPONDENT, THE RESPONDENT'S FIRST 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, AND THAT SAID ALLEGA-
TIONS DO NOT STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO EN-
TITLE DEFENDANT TO RELIEF. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE OB-
JECTION OF THE APPELLANTS TO THE INTRODUC-
TION OF ANY EVIDENCE OF THE RESPONDENT IN 
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SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S FIRST AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE AND THAT SAID DEFENSE DOES NOT 
STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO ENTITLE RESPONDENT 
TO ANY RELIEF. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
FOR THE RESPONDENT. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
FOR THE RESPONDENT FOR THE SUM OF $5,000.00 
AND INTEREST THEREON IN THE SUM OF $647.50, 
OR A NET JUDGMENT OF $399.95, AS A SET OFF OR 
COUNTERCLAIM OR OTHERWISE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION 
OF THE APPELLANT TO STRIKE FROM THE ANSWER 
OF THE RESPONDENT, THE RESPONDENT'S FIRST 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, AND THAT SAID ALLEGA-
TIONS DO NOT STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO EN-
TITLE DEFENDANT TO RELIEF. 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is apparently the contention of the respondent herein, 
that the defense interposed by him in this action was apparently 
not adjudicated in the Courts of Arizona in the original action, 
inasmuch as Respondent proceeded upon the theory of a loan 
and the Supreme Court of Arizona reversed the judgment of 
the Superior Court on this theory, and the Respondent ap-
parently now contends he has a right to interpose a defense or 
cause of action upon a different theory, which he apparently 
contends was not determined by the Arizona Courts. 
It is the contention of the Appellant herein, in support 
of his appeal, that: 
(a) That the affirmative defense interposed by Re-
spondent in his answer to the complaint of the 
Appellant is res adjudicata and Respondent cannot 
again interpose a defense which would go to the 
merits of the case. 
30 American Jur. Page 919, Par. 175. 
"The application of the doctrine of res judicata to 
identical causes of action does not depend upon the 
identity or difference in the forms of the two actions. 
A judgment upon the merits bars a subsequent suit upon 
the same cause, though brought in a different form of 
action, and a party therefore cannot, by varying the 
form of action or adopting a different method of 
presenting his cause, escape the operation of the prin-
cipal that one and the same cause of action shall not 
be twice litigated. On the other hand, the fact that a 
different form or measure of relief is asked does not 
preclude the application of the j~dgr;?ent to estop 
the maintenance of the second actwn. Freeman on 
Judgments, 5th Ed. Par. 684, pp. 1443 and 1444. 
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30 American Jr. Page 920, Par. 178. 
"It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that 
material facts or questions which were in issue in a 
former action, and were there admitted or judicially 
determined are conclusively settled by a judgment 
rendered therein and that such facts or questions be-
come res judicata, and may not again be litigated in 
a subsequent action between the same parties or their 
privies, regardless of the form the issue may take 
in the subsequent action, whether the subsequent action 
involves the same or different form of proceeding, or 
whether the second action is upon the same or a differ-
ent cause of action, subject matter, claim, or demand, 
as the earlier action. In such cases, it is also immaterial 
that the two actions are based on different grounds, 
or tried on different theories, or instituted for different 
purposes, and seek different relief." (See authorities in 
Note 19 thereof). 
30 American Jur. Page 923, Par. 179. 
"The phase of the doctrine of res judicata precluding 
subsequent litigation of the same cause of action is 
much broader in its application than a determination 
of the question involved in the prior action; the con-
clusiveness of the judgment in such case extends not 
only to matters actually determined, but also to other 
matters which could properly have been determined 
in the prior action. This rule applies to every question 
falling within the purview of the original action, in 
respect to matters of both claims, and defense, which 
could have been presented by the exercise of due dili-
gense." 
30 Am. Jur. Page 932, Par. 187. 
"Notwithstanding the general rule that a judgment 
rendered in an action involving a cause of action differ-
10 
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ent from that involved in a subsequent action is not 
conclusive as to matters not litigated in the former 
action, there are many cases in which the doctrine of 
res judicata is held or declared to be applicable to 
defenses which were not raised, but which could prop-
erly have been considered and determined, in the prior 
action, so that if the defendant neglects to set up the 
defense, he is concluded as to the existence thereof 
by the judgment rendered in the action, even though 
the subsequent action involves a different cause of 
action. In support of the rule, it has been held that a 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff is in adjudication, 
not merely as to the existence of the plaintiff's cause 
of action, but, as to the non existence of any defenses 
thereto. In justification of the rule, it has been declared 
that a defendant should not be permitted to split his 
defense and present them by piecemeal in successive 
actions growing out of the same transaction, that there 
must be an end to litigation, and that where a party 
has an opportunity to present his defense and neglects 
to do so the demands of the law require that he take the 
consequences." 
Stephani v. Abbott et al, 30 P. (2d) 1033. Calif. 
"It is not the policy of the law to allow a new and 
different suit between the same parties concerning the 
same subject matter, that has already been litigated. 
Neither will the law allow the parties to trifle with the 
courts by piecemeal litigation. When plaintiff was 
brought into court by defendant in the former case, 
she certainly knew her rights. If she wished to rescind 
the contract, or if she had rescinded it, as she said in 
her answer she had done, then and there was the time 
to present her pleadings and evidence, and insist upon 
all rights to which she was entitled under the law. 
If she could not get the award of the law upon the 
facts in the lower court, she could have appealed. She 
did not do so. She is now met by the presumption that 
11 
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all the facts and matters in controversy were disposed 
of in the former suit, and the further presumption 
that the judgment in the former suit is correct. If she 
failed to assert her claim properly, or to present the 
proper evidence in the first suit, she will not now be 
permitted in a second to litigate it. The principles 
herein stated are elementary." 
Logan City vs. Utah Power and Light Co. 16 Pac. (2d) 1097, 
Utah. 
"It is well stated that it is the duty of a party to inter-
pose such defenses as it may have to an action brought 
against it, and, if it fails to do so, the resulting judg-
ment is conclusive against it as to all matters of de-
fense which were or might have been interposed. And 
ilkewise a party to a judgment is not entitled to have 
it vacated merely because of the existence of certain 
matters of defense of which it fails to avail itself on 
the trial." 
Logan City v. Utah Power and Light Co., 44 Pac. (2d) 698. 
Utah. 
"And such a judgment is final, not only as to the 
matter actually determined, but also as to every other 
matter which might have been litigated by the parties, 
as part of the subject in contrversy, but which was 
omitted from the case through negligence, or inadvert-
ence, or even accident." 
Everill v. Swan, 20 Utah 56, 57 P. 716. 
"These additional matters, relied upon in the answer 
and which were stricken therefrom, could have been 
set up in the former action, and, not having been 
plea"ded in that case, the judgment became conclusive, 
as an adjudication between the parties, not only as to 
matters actually determined, but also as to every other 
12 
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matter which might have been litigated by the parties 
as a part of the subject in controversy, but which was 
omitted from the case through negligence or inadvert-
ence." 
Peay vs. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 331, 40 P. 206. 
"The defendant can only be called upon to answer 
the material allegations of the complaint, and upon 
such allegations the issue is formed, and when judg-
ment is rendered thereon by a court of exclusive juris-
diction, it is conclusive between the parties, upon the 
same matters, unless set aside by a court of last resort. 
And such a judgment is final, not only as to the matter 
actually determined, but also as to every other matter 
which might have been litigated by the parties, as 
part of the subject in controversy, but which was 
omitetd from the case through negligence, or inadvert-
tnce, or even accident." 
Gaskell et al vs. Wallace, 89 Pac. (2d) 687. Calif. 
"It is equally well settled that a judgment rendered 
in a court of competent jurisdiction is res judicata not 
only on all questions actually litigated and decided, 
but on all others that might have been litigated in 
the action. A party is not permitted to split his demands 
or defenses. In Elm v. Sacramento Suburban Fruit 
Lands Co., 17 Pac ( 2d) 1003 this rule was thus an-
nounced: 
"To this situation is clearly applicable the well estab-
lished rule that matters in controversy in the actions 
upon which it is based, but also in all other actions 
involving the same question, and upon all matters in-
volved in the issues which might have been litigated 
and decided in the case; the presumption being that all 
such issues were met and decided. (Cases cited) . The 
judgment operates as res judicata, not only in regard 
13 
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to the existence of the plaintiff's cause of action, but 
as to the nonexistence of the defense which was not 
pleaded.'' 
For further authorities on this identical question see the follow-
ing: 
C. J. S. Vol. 50 Paragraph 65 7 
Curtiss v. Crooks, 66 Pac. 2nd 1140. Washington. 
Besore v. Metropolitan Trust Co. et al. 234 Pac. (2d) 
296. 
Bennett v. City of Salem et al. 235 Pac. (2d) 772. 
Oregon. 
When the objection of the Appellant in this case to the 
introduction of any evidence in support of the affirmative 
defense of the Respondent was overruled, the court permitted 
to be introduced in evidence, among other exhibits, the motion 
of the Respondent for a rehearing before the Supreme Court 
of Arizona, which is designated as Exhibit P-15. In this motion 
the Respondent raises the very question that he pleads in his 
affirmative defense in this action and contends the court should 
have considered both of his theories raised by his complaint 
(Exhibit P-14) in his first and second causes of actions, and 
if the court will examine his complaint (Exhibit P-14) he pleads 
therein the very defense he interposes in this action, which the 
Appellant herein contends was fully determined and adjudi-
cated in the former action. We quote from this motion: 
"Comes now the Appellee in the above entitled appeal 
and respectfully moves the court for a rehearing upon 
the following grounds: 
That the decision of the court is in error in holding 
that the action was one solely to recover money loaned, 
and in failing to consider the other theories of the 
14 
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complaint, and in holding that the evidence was not 
sufficient to justify a recovery by the plaintiff, and 
in reversing the judgment of the lower court in favor 
of the plaintiff and against the defendants, for the rea-
sons following: 
1. The complaint set forth, in addition to a cause of 
action for money loaned, a good cause of action to re-
cover a down payment made under a preliminary con-
tract wherein no provision was made for the forfeiture 
of such down payment, and the parties had agreed that 
the plaintiff might rescind the contract and recover 
such down payment in the event his attorneys de-
termined that the propetry being purchased was sub-
ject to certain Government regulations, as well as set-
ting forth facts entitling plaintiff to recover said down 
payment on the theory of unjust enrichment; and 
2. The evidence was sufficient to show that the 
amount sued for was loaned by planitiff to defendants; 
and 
3. The evidence did not show any agreement between 
the parties for a forfeiture of said down payment; and 
4. The evidence was sufficient to show that said down 
payment was made under preliminary agreement as 
alleged in the complaint and that plaintiff had the 
right to thereunder rescind said contract and recover 
such down payment; and 
5. The evidence was sufficent to show that plaintiff 
was entitled to recover said down payment under the 
theory of unjust enrichment, and: 
6. That in view of the whole case, substantial justice 
was done by the lower court in entering judgment for 
the plaintiff and against the defendant. 
"It is clear from the allegations of the complaint 
that there was a preliminary agreement between the 
15 
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parties which the plaintiff could rescind under certain 
conditions, and that the sum of $5,000 paid by plaintiff 
to defendants thereunder, was to be applied as a credit 
on the purchase price if the sale was consummated . . . 
Whether the transaction of the plaintiff paying the 
defendants $5,000 under such an agreement is de-
scribed as a loan or as a down payment is immaterial, 
since it is clear under the allegations that said sum 
was to be applied as a credit on the purchase price 
if the final contract of sale was consummated . . . 
Under the facts aleged, if the transaction did not 
constitute a loan, then certainly it constituted a down 
payment on the purchase price made under said pre-
liminary agreement. 
Further it is settled in this state that a party may set 
forth in his complaint two or more claims, regardless 
of consistency, and either in one count or in separate 
counts, and need not show on appeal that both theories 
were sustained by his evidence . . . 
The court bases its decision upon the fact that the 
trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff on his 
:first cause of action, for money loaned, rather than 
on the second cause of action which set forth the facts 
of a conditional agreement which was not consum-
mated because the condition upon which it was based 
was not fulfilled. 
The record before the court shows that there was 
never any requirement or demand made by the defend-
ants for the plaintiff to elect which cause of action 
it desired to pursue and consequently under the doc-
trine of substantial justice we respectfully submit that 
the decision heretofore entered by this court be va-
cated and judgment entered in favor of the appellee, 
since on either cause of action he was entitled to 
prevail over the appallant." 
16 
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I have quoted briefly from the motion of Respondent 
above referred to for the purpose of substantiating the position 
of the Appellant herein, that the very defense attempted to 
be interposed by the Respondent herein was both pleaded in 
his complaint before the Superior Court of Arizona, and the 
very question he raises by his motion for a rehearing before 
the Supreme Court of Arizona was ruled upon, by both courts, 
and his motion for a rehearing was denied. The case was re-
manded to the trial court with directions to enter judgment for 
the defendants (Appellants herein). 
By the denial of the motion for a rehearing of the Re-
spondent herein before the Supreme Court of the State of 
Arizona, every consideration was given by said court to the 
very contention the Respondent attempts to plead and prove 
in this case, and such denial of his said motion constitutes an 
adjudication of the merits of this case, and said Respondent 
cannot now interpose his affirmative defense, and retry the 
case before this court. 
(b) That said purported affirmative defense cannot 
be interposed in an action on a judgment as a set 
off or counterclaim. 
30 Am. Jur. page 9?J7, Par. 193. 
"On the theory that matters which have once been 
fully investigated between the parties and determined 
by the court shall not again be contested, the doctrine 
of res judicata as to a cause of action which has been 
litigated has been held to prevail where such cause 
of action was attempted to be interposed as an offset in 
a subsequent action between the same parties. 77 N.E. 
40, N.Y. 181 U.S. 117,45 Led. 776 3 L. R. A. NS 1042. 
17 
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I quote the above for the reason that in the findings of 
fact in this case the court allowed a judgment for the Re-
spondent as a set off and which the Appellant herein contends 
is an error of the court. 
(c) That the court is bound to conform to the full 
faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the 
United States in giving full faith and credit to 
the judgment of a sister state. 
Thompson v. William Ede Co., 103 Pac. (2d) 530. Oklahoma. 
"The action being one of a judgment of a sister 
state it was not open to re-examination upon its merits.'' 
Reed vs. Hollister, 212 Pac. 367, Oregon. 
·'The right to enforce this judgment the force and 
effect to be given to it is protected and guaranteed 
by the Constitution of the United States. The courts 
of this state have no power to go behind it or to re-
examine it upon its merits. On the contrary it is con-
clusive evidence of every matter properly adjudicated 
and is entitled to the same faith and credit in this state 
as in the state where rendered." 
35 Am. Jur. Page 145, Par. 535. 
"Under the full faith and credit clause of the Con-
stitution of the United States, a judgment rendered by 
a court of one state is, in the courts of another state 
of the Union, binding, and conclusive, as to the merits 
adjudicated. It is improper to permit an alteration or 
re-examination of the judgment, or of the grounds 
on which it is based." 
50 C. J. S. Page 493, Par. 891 
"Under the ful faith and credit clause of the Federal 
Constitution and the general rules discussed supra, a 
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final valid judgment on the merits rendered by a com-
petent court having jurisdiction of the parties and the 
subject matter is conclusive in every other state and the 
merits cannot be reinvestigated. The full faith and 
credit clause of the Federal Constitution precludes any 
inquiry into the merits of the cause of action, the logi-
cal or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the 
legal principles, on which the judgment is based. 
"A judgment in another state by a court having 
jurisdiction is conclusive not only as to all matters 
which were actually in issue and decided in that suit, 
or which were necessarily implied in, or to be inferred 
from the judgment, in the sense that the judgment 
could not have been rendered without the finding or 
determination of such matters, but also as to other 
matters, which the parties might have litigated and 
which might have been decided as incident to, or 
essentially connected with, the subject matter of the 
litigation within the purview of the original action, 
either as a matter of claim or of defense. 
Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449, 72 L. Ed 365. 
"It is settled by repeated decisions of this court 
that the full faith and credit clause of the constitution 
requires that the judgment of a State Court which had 
jurisdiction of the parties, and the subject matter in 
suit, shall be given in the courts of every other state 
the same credit, validity and effect which it has in the 
State where it was rendered, and be equally conclu-
sive upon the merits; ... and the judgment, if valid 
where rendered, must be enforced in such other State 
although repugnant to its own statutes." 
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland vs. Clanton, 28 Pac. ( 2d) 
566. Oklahoma. 
"The obligation to accord full faith and credit to 
a valid judgment, other than for lack of jurisdiction 
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of the person or subject matter, or for the enforcement 
of a penalty, is without limitation. Also the consti-
tutional and statutory provisions referred to protect a 
judgment of a court of a sister state against collateral 
impeachment.'' 
The foregoing law is elementary, but we quote the fore-
going for the reason of reference to the law, and for the fur-
ther purpose that the judgment herein sued upon was never 
attacked by the Respondent for any irregularities, or grounds 
provided by law to impeach such a judgment, and the same 
is regular and not questioned. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE OB-
JECTION OF THE APPELLANTS TO THE INTRODUC-
TION OF ANY EVIDENCE OF THE RESPONDENT IN 
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S FIRST AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE AND THAT SAID DEFENSE DOES NOT 
STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO ENTITLE RESPONDENT 
TO ANY RELIEF. 
Without further discussion of the above point, we feel 
that the argument and the authorities set forth in Point 1 above 
covers the error of the court in overruling the objections of 
the Appellant herein to the introduction of any evidence on 
the part of the Respondent in support of his affirmative de-
fense and permitting this case to be tried anew. 
We do however respectfully request the court to examine 
the evidence as contained in Exhibit P -17 of this case, which 
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is a transcript of the evidence of the case as tried in the Superior 
Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Mari-
copa. There was no new evidence produced in the case before 
the lower court. It was substantially the same evidence that 
was introduced in the Superior Court of Arizona. This cannot 
be done, as the Respondent is precluded from trying this 
case again on the merits by reason of the law pertaining to 
res judicata, estoppel and the full faith and credit provision 
of the Constitution of the United States as is substantially 
set forth in the authorities hereinabove. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
FOR THE RESPONDENT. 
We anticipate that the Respondent will contend that the 
Court of Arizona did not adjudicate this matter fully and did 
not take into consideration the second theory of Respondent's 
cause of action, and that he has a right to interpose such a 
defense in this action on this judgment. We feel that what 
has been outlined by Appellants in their argument in support 
of Point I herein has fully covered this without elaborating 
more in support of Point III, we feel that the following is very 
enlightening and a determining factor in this matter: 
50 C. ]. S. Page 141, Page 686. 
"A fact or question which was in issue in a former 
suit, and was there judicially passed on and determined 
by a domestic court of competent jurisdiction, is con-
clusively settled by the judgment therein, as far as con-
cerns the parties to that action and persons in privity 
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with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future 
action between such parties or privies, in the same court 
or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, on either 
the same of different cause of action, while the judg-
ment remains unreversed, unmodified, or unvacted by 
proper authority. This Doctrine of the conclusiveness 
of judgment is sometimes referred to alternatively as 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and, as judicially 
noted, it is simple and universally recognized in almost 
innumerable cases. 
The force of the estoppel lies in the judgment itself; 
it is not the findings of the court or the verdict of the 
jury which concludes the parties, but the judgment 
itself entered thereon. Likewise the conclusiveness of 
an adjudication depends on the source from which it 
came and the issues it determined, and not on the vio-
lence of the controversy. The reasoning of the court 
in rendering a judgment forms no part of the judg-
ment, with respect to its conclusiveness, nor are the 
parties bound by remarks made or opinions expressed 
by the court in deciding the cause, which do not neces-
sarily enter into the judgment." 
We respectfully submit that the District Court erred 
m entering judgment for the Respondent in this case. The 
judgment sued on in this case was never attacked by the Re-
spondent, either in his pleadings or in his evidence and as 
long as the judgment of the Superior Court of Arizona, sued 
on herein, stands, the court was without authority to again try 
this case on the merits. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
FOR THE RESPONDENT FOR THE SUM OF $5,000.00 
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AND INTEREST THEREON IN THE SUM OF $647.50, 
OR A NET JUDGMENT OF $399.95, AS A SET OFF OR 
COUNTERCLAIM OR OTHERWISE. 
Upon what theory the court found a judgment in the 
net sum of $399.95 in favor of the Respondent and against 
the Appellant, we are unable to determine, (Tr. 93-94-95) 
other than the fact that the Appellant had the sum of $5,000.00 
in their possession for a short time after the judgment was 
entered in favor of Respondent in the Superior Court of Ari-
zona. It was conceded by Respondent that the $5,000.00 was 
returned to the Respondent by Appellants herein shortly after 
the judgment was rendered and such a finding was so made 
in the pre-trial of the lower court, Paragraph 5, (Tr. 10) and 
no issue was raised on that question, nor was any affirmative 
relief demanded or pleaded by Respondent, nor evidence in-
troducd on this point. While there is nothing in the record 
of this case, either by way of evidence or pleadings with re-
spect to interest being allowed on the $5,000.00 in question, 
while it was in the possession of Appellants, the court con-
cludes that the Respondent was entitled to interest. From what 
source the lower court concludes this we are unable to deter-
mine, and for that reason we respectfully submit it was not 
within the court's jurisdiction to make such a finding or con-
clusion or judgment in this respect. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BENJAMIN SPENCE 
Attorney for Appellant 
1401 Walker Bank Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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